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Mucius Scaevola and the Essence of Manly Patientia 
For Jonathan 
Not long ago, Robert Kaster pointed to the delicacy of the Roman concept of manly patientia, 
the ability to endure hardship and pain. In short, painful suffering can become an unmanly 
condition. According to the phallic model of Roman masculinity, a man acts and penetrates. 
Nothing should pierce his surface.1 There are exceptions to this impenetrability in the military 
sphere, hedged in and compensated by the high social status of the organization with its own 
honor code.2 The individual sufferer, however, lacks these compensations, and his endurance 
might easily appear as a loss of face and status. This is particularly true of physical pain 
inflicted by others, an experience closely connected to the predicament of slaves, who were 
the ones to be submitted to torture and physical abuse.3 In this paper, I will focus on the 
Roman embodiment of patientia, C. Mucius Cordus Scaevola, and explore how the 
ambivalence of patientia surfaces and is dealt with in different representations of this 
exemplum. These comparative readings will demonstrate that social intricacies shape not only 
the rhetorical and literary expression in accounts of virtuous behavior but its very 
conceptualization, also in a philosophical context.4 
 
1. The problems with patientia: some statistics 
The distribution in the relevant chapter (3.3) of Valerius Maximus’ collection of Memorable 
Deeds and Sayings is symptomatic of patientia’s problematic nature. Whereas twenty-four 
Roman paragons of fortitude stand against nine external examples, the ratio is inverse for 
patientia with only two Roman ones – Scaevola and an otherwise unknown Pompey, a 
Scaevola ‘light’5 – against seven from abroad. Valerius himself explains the shortness of his 
list with his reluctance to mention the civil wars (3.3.2), but even then the scarcity of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Walters 1997 and Fredrick 2002, with qualifying comments by Williams 2010. For a general 
tendency to elide the male elite body from discourse because it constitutes a danger to social status, see, e.g., 
Bartsch 2006; Wildberger 2010. 
2 See, e.g., Lendon 1997. 
3 On physical punishment of a free person as a “symbol of tyranny” and a recurrent concern in Seneca, see 
Courtil 2014. 
4 Because of the methodical complications that would exceed the scope of this paper, I will not discuss possible 
reflections of Scaevola in two characters, Scaeva (on whom see, e.g., Delcourt 1957, p. 179; Barsch 2006, 178), 
and Murrus (especially 9.832-3; see below n. 42). Also very interesting for the topic at hand, even though no 
distinction is made between Greek and Roman masculinities, is Conway 2008, ch. 4 on ways in which 
masculinity is hedged and reinterpreted in accounts of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion. 
5 Pompey burns only a finger. It looks as if a name confusion has happened here. Livy (44.27.11) mentions 
negotiations of an Illyrian king Gentius with M. Perpena and M. Petilius. For further discussion, see Otto 1912, 
320; Combès 1995, 319 n. 12. 
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examples from other contexts would be remarkable. As Claude Lutsch notes (1988, 35), M. 
Atilius Regulus’ suffering at the hand of the Carthaginians is not narrated in his eulogy in Val. 
Max. 1.1.14. Such details could not have added to the glory of the man, and were postponed 
to a more suitable place, to illustrate the cruelty of Rome’s enemies (9.2 ext. 1). 
A similar dearth of heroic Roman sufferers can be observed in Cicero’s second book of the 
Tusculanae disputationes devoted to the question whether physical pain is an evil.6 Cicero has 
Virtue adduce “boys in Sparta, youths in Olympia, and barbarians in the arena” (Tusc. 2.46) in 
her exhortation to endure pain in a manly fashion.7 Contrary to his general zest to replace 
Greek with Roman models, in this book pain-resistant Greeks and barbarians prevail, men 
from the myths as well as philosophers.8 As concerns Romans, only one exemplum, that of 
Marius, is narrated in any detail (35, 53). Decii rushing fearlessly toward the “flashing 
swords” of the enemy’s battle line (59) are mentioned in passing, and the description stops 
before the fatal clash itself. It is a Greek commander, Epaminondas, who does not wince 
when feeling the pain of his mortal wound (59). The same picture emerges when we look at 
collectives: There is only one quick remark that soldiers do not feel their wounds in battle 
(58) and much more mention of training and exercises that prepare them “for wounds” but 
leave the body’s surface unscathed (37-38). As if there was something obscene in describing a 
free Roman being beaten or having his skin pierced, all detail of actual injuries inflicted is 
reserved for other contexts, when Cicero speaks about Spartan boys whipped at the altar of 
Arthemis Orthia,9 wrestling youths (36), boxers (41), and gladiators, who are characterized 
with features pointing to their status of slaves, as criminal “outlaws or barbarians” and as 
willing to serve their masters and please their audience (41). 
 
2. Agency 
When praising the fortitude of another M. Atilius, one of the old men expecting their death at 
the hands of the Gauls sacking the city of Rome (380 BCE), Valerius Maximus concludes: 
“So manliness (virtus) is unable to be seized; it does not know the disgrace of patientia; 
                                                 
6 On this book, see François Prost’s contribution to this volume. On philosophical theories of pain, Prost 2004. 
7 The thesis to be defended in this passage is: “to stand up to pain and bear it (toleranter dolorem pati) is a mark 
of men who are great-minded and enduring (patientium) and defeaters of all that is human” (Cic. Tusc. 2.43). 
8 Eurypylus returning to the ships with a battle wound and deferring treatment to answer Achilles’ questions (38-
39); Odysseus wounded by the poisoned spear of his son Telegonus (48-50); the proverbial Epicurean sage in the 
bull of Phalaris (17-18); Zeno of Elea, Anaxarchus of Abdera (52), and the Indian gymnosophist Calanus (52, 
compare 40 and SVF 1.241); Posidonius (61). 
9 Cic. Tusc. 2.34; Plu. Mor. 293c. 
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submitting to fortune it regards as more dismal than any other fate.”10 This could serve as a 
motto for Livy’s account of Mucius’ exploit (2.12-13). Livy presents a level-headed, 
circumspect young man, who is not treated lightly by Fortune11 but able to turn its blows to 
his advantage with a combination of intelligence and fortitude.12 Mucius feels indignation at 
the fact that now that Rome is free, she should be besieged, when no one dared to do so while 
she was under the Kings (12.2). This emotion leads to action and finally to both his own and 
his city’s liberation.13 He also senses fear: His fear of disgrace if he were to be taken for a 
deserter leads to the reasonable measure of seeking the Senate’s permission first (12-4-5); his 
fear of asking who of the two richly clad men on the tribunal is King Porsenna, lest he be 
recognized as a stranger, motivates his decision to try his luck and just stab one of the two 
(12.7). In contrast to such reasonable caution, he instils terror even when alone among a 
hostile crowd and as a captive.14 Unimpressed by King Porsenna’s menaces,15 he assumes a 
threatening role himself and makes the other feel even greater alarm than anger,16 so much so 
that he seeks a peace agreement with the Romans (13.1-2). The means by which Mucius 
achieves this success are both his courageous conduct and an ingenious ad-hoc lie, the 
menace that he, Mucius, would be only the first of three-hundred Roman youths having sworn 
to try their luck in a similar manner and come, on after the other, to assassinate the enemy 
king (12.10-11, 15-16). 
In addition to these antitheses, which set off Mucius’ mental maturity from his impulsive and 
gullible opponent, Livy’s narrative is rich in carefully motivated turns and surprises. One of 
these surprises is Mucius’ lie, which constitutes part of his refusal to behave like a captive. He 
remains in attack mode throughout, does not surrender the initiative to his captors, and this is 
                                                 
10 3.2.7 capi ergo virtus nescit, patientiae dedecus ignorat, fortunae succumbere omni fato tristius ducit. 
11 12.4 fortuna … urbis; 12.7 ibi … forte; quo temere traxit fortuna facinus; inter tantas fortunae minas. 
12 Livy’s Mucius lacks the vanity and stealth of his counterpart in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.27-30, and this must be 
a deliberate modification of the story on Livy’s part since both authors follow the same source, but Dionysius 
more closely than the Roman author (Ogilvie 1965, p. 263). In Dionysius’ version, Mucius convenes the Senate 
in order to secure recognition for his deed (27); unlike the more intelligent Mucius in Livy, who takes a 
calculated risk, he just confuses the scribe with the king (28.2). While Livy omits to tell us how Mucius managed 
to get into the camp and near the tribunal, Dionysius’ Mucius pretends to be a deserter (27.4, 29.1, or as an 
Etruscan: 28.1) and creeps up to the scribe as if unarmed (28.3). When interrogated by Porsenna, he negotiates 
safety from torture in order to obtain an opportunity to tell his lie about the conjuration of Patrician youths 
(29.2). Porsenna is alarmed, but keeps Mucius under arrest (30.1) and does not negotiate a peace agreement 
immediately. Plutarch, Publicola 17 follows Livius closely. Münzer’s RE-article (1933) contains a detailed 
comparison of the information conveyed in the sources. On Livy’s version of the story, see also Wenzel 1997. 
13 12.3 magno audacique aliquo facinore eam indignitatem vindicandum ratus; 12.14 iure belli liberum; 13.1-2. 
14 12.8 qua per trepidam turbam sibi ipse fecerat viam; tum quoque inter tantas fortunae minas metuendus magis 
quam metuens. In Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.28.3, he is arrested on the spot without any resistance; there is no 
terrified crowd and no need to wait until reinforcements have been fetched. 
15 12.12 minitabundus; 12.15 quod minis nequisti. 
16 12.12 ira infensus periculoque conterritus. This aspect is highlighted in Festus’ version (Epit. 1.4): cum 
interim – immane dictu – hic interritus, ille trepidaret, tamquam manus regis arderet. 
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also the tactic that motivates his exemplary act. He is the one to speak first,17 and when 
Porsenna gives orders to torture him to learn more about the mysterious danger the Roman 
had hinted at, Mucius acts instead of being acted upon.18 He thus exemplifies what Kaster 
describes as “aggressive passivity”. Patientia of that kind “comes as close to an active role as 
circumstances allow” and “says not only ‘I am’ but also ‘I choose,’ against experience that 
seems to threaten existence and nullify choice.”19 Active initiative serves as a hedge against 
the loss of social integrity which a free man would incur when passively subjected to torture. 
Mucius comes away not a humiliated victim but intactus inviolatusque, “untouched and 
unsullied” (12.14), as Porsenna describes it with a phrase that hints at deep humiliation or 
even sexual transgression.20 In spite of the loss of his hand, Mucius remains pure and, in a 
sense, unhurt since he was able to maintain control over his own body; no other person was 
allowed to “touch” it.  
The same strategy reoccurs in the second Roman example for patientia adduced by Valerius 
Maximus: Pompey preempts an attempt to torture him by burning a finger and thus elicits 
similar submission in his opponent to the yielding that Scaevola achieves in Livy’s account 
(Val. Max. 3.3.2). Contrary to this, the Greek examples in Valerius Maximus demonstrate 
their patientia while actually subjected to torture, some of a grossly disgusting nature. The 
first of these is similar to the Roman ones as concerns the nature of the pain, but very different 
in its nuances. A comparison will be instructive: Here too, a male person endures the pain of 
burning, and the endurance may seem even more praiseworthy since the brave sufferer is still 
a boy. Serving King Alexander of Macedon at a sacrifice, he does not move to shrug off a 
piece of burning coal that has fallen on his arm. The boy willingly decides to bear the pain, 
but this is a far remove from the “aggressive passivity” shown by Mucius and Pompey. The 
two Romans actively inflict the pain on themselves. The boy submits to a painful situation 
that has befallen him by chance, and then his suffering is even actively increased by someone 
else – the King who notices what has happened and deliberately prolongs the ritual to test his 
attendant, enjoying this display of perseverance. It is not unlikely that the detail was invented 
in the original account to enhance the valor of the boy, but as we begin to see, it would not 
have suited Roman sensibilities. It becomes a stock element of the Scaevola-exemplum that 
                                                 
17 In Dion. Hal., Porsenna speaks first, addressing Mucius with offensive words as μιαρώτατε πάντων ... 
ἀνθρώπων (Ant. Rom. 28.4). 
18 In Festus’ Epitome (1.4), he is the only one who acts; Porsenna only appears as the one who is frightened (see 
n. 16. 
19 Kaster 2002, pp. 136, 137. Compare also Barton 2001, p. 40: “A male was transformed into a man by willful 
expenditure of energy. Above all, a man willed himself to be expendable.” My point here is that not every form 
of “expenditure” was generative of honor or masculinity in this sense.  
20 See, e.g., OLD s.v. uiolo 2. 
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Porsenna removes the cause of pain rather than creating it. Yet another detail may be relevant: 
the coal burns through the skin of the boy, so that even the bystanders notice “the smell of his 
scorched body.” The bodies of Mucius and Pompey are not penetrated; rather, a limb is 
parched away and dissolved. 
The importance of agency is confirmed also in Augustine’s summary of Livy’s account (Civ. 
Dei 5.18): There, intimidating the king becomes the purpose of Mucius’ self-mutilation, and 
so the captive inverts the hierarchy between the two parties in this version as well. What is 
more, when Augustine compares Mucius with a Christian martyr, the paradoxical climax of 
sacrifice that he constructs conveys the same scale of values. Just as it is worse to have one’s 
whole body burnt and not just one hand, so it is a greater sacrifice to suffer (patiens) the 
burning at the hands of another instead of actively (faciens) inflicting it on oneself.21  
 
3. Separation from the body 
Paradoxically, the reason why Livy’s Mucius is able to protect his body from debasement is 
the fact that he himself regards it as a thing of no value. Thrusting his hand into the fire on the 
altar, he demonstrates to the king “how little worth men assign to their body when they see 
great glory before their eyes.”22 He burns his hand “as if his mind had become numb” – 
literally: a stranger – “to his senses.”23 This paradox can be resolved by distinguishing what I 
would like to call (i) the ‘social’ or ‘visible body,’ the physical embodiment of the person by 
which that person is present, and also vulnerable, in a social context, and (ii) the ‘internal 
body,’ the bodily component of the person as controlled by, and ideally subject to, that 
person’s mind. Scaevola is willing to sacrifice a part of the latter in order to protect the former 
from defilement. He does so by giving the external impression through the behavior of his 
‘visible body’ (i) that he has mentally separated himself (alienare) from his ‘internal body’ 
(ii), the flesh with its strong sensations. 
Another way of protecting the ‘social’ body (i) is to make it invisible. We have already noted 
the attention paid to the body of the boy in the first external exemplum of patientia in Valerius 
Maximus. The description is full of sensual physical detail: the smell of the burning flesh 
reaches the nostrils (nares) of the bystanders. The boy himself strains to keep his arm 
unmoved and suppresses a groan (gemitus) in order not to disturb the sacrifice. All this is 
                                                 
21 Augustin. Civ. Dei 5.18 si pro illo non unam manum neque hoc sibi ultro faciens sed persequente aliquo 
patiens totum flammis corpus inpenderit. 
22 12.13 quam vile corpus sit iis qui magnam gloriam vident. 
23 12.13 velut alienato ab sensu […] animo. 
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missing in Livy’s narrative: Mucius’ body is invisible with the single exception of his right 
hand. There is an intention to act, to perform a great deed,24 there is a weapon (12.5, 8, 10), 
and there is the young man as a whole, who might be caught and hindered in his movement,25 
surrounded by fire (12.12) or removed from the altar – as a whole, not his body or just his arm 
with the burning hand (12.13). Just as Mucius’ body thus dissolves into action, it is numbed 
away in the moment of burning.  
A similar vanishing of the body can be observed with the practice – and concomitant topos – 
of manly tolerance of the pain caused by surgery of varices. According to Cicero, Marius was 
the first to undergo this therapy without fixation, thus setting a new standard for the future. 
This is the characteristic inversion of passive suffering – being bound and cut by a physician – 
to activity: Marius forbids any fixation (Tusc. 2.53), he institutes a new custom, and he offers 
or does not offer (praebuit) his leg for cutting. Those acting on him are completely elided, 
unnamed and invisible agents hidden behind passive verb forms. Still, Cicero’s Marius very 
clearly does feel pain, so much so that he refuses surgery on the other leg (2.53). Manly 
activity and elision of the body have reached a new level in Seneca’s reference to the same 
practice one-hundred years later: There, the man who offers his varices for cutting continues 
to read a book, as if nothing happened to his body at all.26 Absolute composure of the socially 
relevant, visible body (i), to such a degree that we only see the man in action, thus showcases 
the degree to which he, as a person, is the master of his internal body (ii). 
Yet another step of alienation between body and mind is hinted at when Livy describes the 
loss of Mucius’ right hand as clades dextrae (13.1). Even though clades can be used in the 
sense of “destruction,” this standard term for a terrible military defeat suggests the idea that 
the man had prevailed, while his hand was vanquished.27 This idea, that man and hand are 
almost separate agents, is developed and inverted in later versions of the example (see section 
6, below), and also in Valerius Maximus’ account. There, the burning of the hand becomes a 
pointless act of self-castigation. Having conceived a deep dislike for his right hand, Mucius 
has the useless servant thrown into the fire and suffers, in the sense of “permitting,” it to be 
burned completely.28 Such imagery enhances an agent’s control over his inner body (ii) by 
                                                 
24 Magnum facinus (12.3, 5; compare also 12.7 quo temere traxit fortuna facinus; 12.8 et facere et pati fortia). 
25 By the Romans, in the imagined scenario that Mucius would be mistaken for a deserter: deprehensus … 
retraheretur (12.3); by Porsenna’s guard: comprehensum … retraxissent (12.8). 
26 Sen. Ep. 78.18 ille qui dum varices exsecandas praeberet legere librum perseueravit. 
27 OLD s.v. clades 3 and 2.  
28 Val. Max. 3.3.1 perosus enim, ut credo, dexteram suam quod eius ministerio in caede regis uti nequisset, 
iniectam foculo exuri passus est. 
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displaying its subordination to the person’s will. The sufferer becomes the stern master 
punishing a slave.  
It is clear that reduction of historical narrative to a few lines of pointed exemplum require 
omission and simplification.29 Livy’s basic plot is retained but stripped of its turns and 
surprises, such as the consultation of the senate, the confusion of king and scribe, Mucius’ 
menace and lie, and Porsenna’s counter-threat of torture. As a result, Mucius no longer has a 
plausible reason for burning his hand – there is no need to preempt aggression to one’s body 
by another person – and so Valerius invents a new motive: anger at his own failure. The 
parenthesis ut credo that modifies this information suggests that it does not derive from the 
tradition. Of course, the expression may be a stylistic device, e.g. to underscore the 
plausibility of a traditional explanation by pretending that it was found through one’s own 
reckoning. However, no other version before Valerius introduces such a motivation,30 and it 
sits not very well with other aspects of the anecdote, such as the idea that Porsenna is made to 
forget his own danger – at a point in the narrative when the king has no longer any reason for 
fear since the assassin is caught – and that Porsenna is made to “turn his own revenge into 
admiration,” an idea that corresponds to the move from passive suffering to actively seeking 
pain in order to impress or intimidate to maintain one’s status and social integrity, just as we 
find it in Livius. 
 
4. Spectacle 
Another aspect not perfectly integrated with the motif of self-castigation is the spectacular 
nature of the deed. One reason why Valerius may have omitted the practical effects which 
Mucius’ actions had for Rome in Livy’s account may be the fact that he transposed this aspect 
to the second example, in which Pompey “inflicts on” King Gentius “despair that anything 
could be learned from him by way of torture and creates in him a great desire to seek the 
friendship of the Roman people” (3.3.2). As the first and most famous Roman example, 
Mucius’ deed is afforded an even more hallowed meaning, a glorification of hero and 
fatherland that weighs more than a simple peace treaty. Valerius’ Mucius elicits admiration, 
                                                 
29 On Valerius’ “spessore poetico,” see e.g. Guerrini 1981 and for his treatment of Livy as a subtext Bloomer 
1992, p. 67. 
30 Ogilvie 1965, p. 262 interprets the burning as originally a punishment for perjury, but it is unlikely that 
Valerius would have known that story, if it was ever told about Scaevola in historical times at all. Ogilvie 
himself points to Hellenistic elements in the known version, which he dates to c. 200 BCE (pp. 262-263). 




just like his counterpart in Livy, where Porsenna is “almost thunderstruck by this miracle” 
(12.13). However, while Livy focuses on the strong emotions and actions that Mucius causes 
in his human opponent, Valerius points to the timelessness and divinity of virtue. The great 
glory envisaged by the hero himself in Livy’s version (12.13) is now an objective fact: the 
“eternal glory” characterizing Scaevola’s name, which he brings back to Rome as a welcome 
asset together with his own person.31 The small altar that happened to be lit nearby in order to 
provide Mucius with some ready fire in Livy, becomes a full-blown, very special ritual before 
the attentive eyes of the immortal gods.32 
 
5. Condensation: Seneca 
All elements noted so far – activity, alienation, and spectacle – reoccur enhanced and tightly 
knit into a consistent model in various versions of the same example in Seneca’s prose 
works.33 By this, I do not wish to make any assertion about the dependencies of sources. We 
can assume that all authors after Livy knew that account, and that Martial had read at least 
significant portions of Seneca’s works. Whether Seneca knew and used Valerius Maximus’ 
collection is debated, but need not be decided here.34 We are exploring occurrences of a well-
known Roman cultural icon that must have been present to the educated elite in many 
disguises, and what is of interest for this paper are the elements of that exemplum and their 
significance with a view to Roman social values and conceptions of masculinity.  
Mucius is even more of an agent in Seneca than in the previous sources. Whereas he is 
arrested and moved around in Livy’s account, and still overcome in Valerius Maximus’ 
narrative (3.3.1 oppressus), Seneca’s Mucius stands apparently free with no one holding him. 
He stops burning his hand only when Porsenna intercedes, but unlike Livy’s Mucius, who is 
himself removed from the fire, Seneca’s Mucius cannot continue burning himself because 
Porsenna has the fire removed from him. More dignified than Valerius’ Mucius, Seneca’s is a 
severe general or judge exacting punishment,35 not a slave-owner outraged at his useless 
servant. In accord with his enhanced activity, his suffering has become “doing” (facere).36 In 
                                                 
31 Val. Max. 3.3.1 urbi se cum aeternae gloriae cognomine Scaevolae reddidit. 
32 In Valerius’ version, the gods observe Mucius’ worship (admotum aris cultum) and Porsenna is performing a 
sacrifice when Mucius attacks him, whereas Livy mentions a sacrifice to explain the presence of an open fire.  
33 On the Scaevola-exemplum in Seneca, see Heikkinen 1997, especially as concerns its philosophical 
significance.  
34 On the question of Valerius’ sources and reception, see, e.g., Bloomer 1992. He assumes that Seneca knew and 
used Valerius Maximus’ collection (pp. 64-77). 
35 Sen. Ep. 24.5 poenas a se irriti conatus exigentem; facilius Porsina Mucio ignovit […] quam sibi Mucius; 
Dial. 1.3.4 ipse a se exigit erroris sui poenas. So also in [Aur. Vict.] De vir. ill. 12.3. 
36 24.5 facere aliquid in illis castris felicius potuit, nihil fortius. 
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Ep. 24.5, he “exacts punishment,” does not “remove” a hand, is “more energetic at seizing 
danger” (acrior … ad occupanda pericula) than cruelty at imposing it. Physical pain becomes 
a “danger” to be “seized” or “occupied” like a fortress! Here suffering has turned into 
conquest, the most strenuous of activities available to a Roman man, and similar imagery 
occurs at Dial. 1.3.4: Mucius “presses down (premit)37 the fires of his enemies” and “routs 
(fugat) the king”38 with his mutilated hand. In Ep. 66.53, “he puts an end to war, unarmed and 
crippled.” Mucius’ handicapped body thus provides an occasion for demonstrating the 
superior agency of virtue irrespective of the physical condition of a person. Mastery over the 
internal body (ii) thus has a social impact by display of the visible body (i) in its mutilation. 
Similarly, in Ep. 98.14, a man becomes an exemplum by repelling the “invasion” of pains into 
his body by turning this into a challenge and victory over Fortune.39 When “pains invade” a 
man’s “body” he  
Seneca also takes up the motif of Fortune from Livy, an idea central to what the philosopher 
wishes to illustrate with the exemplum, namely that nothing bad happens to Mucius, that on 
the contrary he is able to turn what others would regard as misfortune into a success and a 
good thing. Mucius is happy (felix)40 and, by his virtue, in possession of a true good. At Ep. 
66.51 Porsenna “envies” him for his glory and for this reason orders the fire to be taken away 
from him (eripi). The distinction between the physical body as a part of oneself (ii) and the 
body as the outward manifestation of the person (ii) receives a Stoic interpretation: As part of 
the person, the ‘inner’ body (ii) is a tool of virtuous agency, one that is disposable for an 
ulterior reason; the visible ‘social’ body (i) is the form in which virtue acts and makes its 
exemplarity visible to others.  
In Seneca’s versions this double significance of the body creates a double perspective on the 
spectacle of Mucius’ burning hand.41 In one perspective, Mucius has such control over his 
body, is so numbed and alienated from this part of his own, that he is able to “stand” (Ep. 24.5 
& 66.51 stetit) and “watch” (24.5 spectator; 66.51 perspectavit) his hand “dripping” 
(destillans) from the bones with gruesome detail. The individual standing and watching his 
own pain seems to have become iconic, if we are to judge from parallels in Lucan and 
                                                 
37 Similarly in Ep. 76.20 inventus est qui flammis manum imponeret. The hand is not thrust into the fire but 
placed upon it, the movement thus expressing the proper hierarchy: the human acting upon a thing, be it as 
painful as it may. Conceived as a victory also at Ep. 98.12 ignem Mucius [sc. vicit]. 
38 Similarly on Scaevola’s shield in Sil. Ital. 8.389 effugiens ardentem Porsena dextram. 
39 Sen. Ep. 98.14 Simus inter exempla! […] ut possimus dolores quocumque modo corpus invaserint perferre et 
Fortunae dicere: “Cum viro tibi negotium est: quaere quem vincas.” 
40 See in particular Dial. 1.3.4, and compare also Benef. 7.15.2 et Mucio manus in hostili ara relicta instar occisi 
Porsinae fuit, et semper contra fortunam luctata virtus etiam citra effectum propositi operis enituit. 
41 Heikkinen 1997, 67, who contrasts Mucius’ gaze with that of Porsenna. 
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Martial.42 In Seneca’s accounts, such internal focalization is a device for evaluating apparent 
evils and training how to face them in future (praemeditatio futurorum malorum).43 The 
reader shares Mucius’ gaze, becomes the exemplum himself, and thus prepares for being 
numb against pain and despising his viler part44 just as bravely as this model. It is by his 
ability to look down upon a part of his internal body (ii) and assess it as the indifferent it is 
that Mucius achieves both internal greatness (magnitudo animi) and the glory earned by the 
display of his social body (i).45 From that second perspective of an outside witness, both 
Mucius and the reader also stand as admirers of the act, the spectacle of virtue visibly 
asserting its agency by full control over the person as manifest in a bodily posture.46 
Displaying one’s body to the gaze of others was an ambivalent affair in Rome. Carlin A. 
Barton, for example, notes: 47  
A tension, a dilemma for the person of honor in ancient Rome had ever been the need 
to display oneself to others while simultaneously preserving an inviolate and protected 
sphere, the source and power of one’s will, the animus […].  
One hedge the philosopher can add to those already mentioned is, accordingly, to reduce the 
bodily nature of patientia and enhance the spiritual, intellectual nature of the mind as the 
person’s core. Here, again, we see how the discourses of Stoicism and of masculinity unite 
within a dispositif of elite manliness. Intellect is superior to physical strength: Seneca’s 
reading patient outperforms even a Marius with his display of intellectual engagement (see p. 
2). Mucius too will be outperformed if the progressor, the student on his way to wisdom, has 
learned his lessons. In Ep. 24.5, a somewhat stolid, uneducated youth draws “only” on 
“soldierly strength” (militari tantum robore) for his self-punishment; Lucilius will be much 
better “equipped with” reasoned argument and “precepts against death and pain.”48 In the 
                                                 
42 See Lucan 9.832f. with Wick’s 2004 commentary on the passage, and for Martial, the next section, below. A 
particularly thorough discussion of spectacle and gaze, also in the sphere of Imperial philosophy, is Bartsch 
2006. Yet another type of gaze is introduced by Plutarch in a version otherwise very similar to Livy’s account. 
There, Mucius stares down Porsenna: “Holding his right hand [over the fire] while his flesh was burning, he 
stood looking at Porsinna with a bold and invincible expression” until the king surrenders and, as a symbol of his 
defeat, gives Mucius back his sword (Publicola 17.4; followed by Zonaras 7.12, vol. 1 p. 122 Dindorf). 
43 Edwards 1999 underscores the degree to which visual imagination is employed by Seneca to evoke, and treat, 
pain-related fear. My focus of interest differs from hers in that I am interested not in the imaginings of pain and 
torture as, e.g., in Ep. 14, but in the representations of men actually having pain violently inflicted on them. 
44 Sen. Ep. 66.51 hostium flammarumque contemptor. 
45 Compare also Sen. Controv. 8.4 Non aliud Scaevolae Mucio cognomen dedit et capto contra Porsennan regem 
libertatem reliquit quam vilitas sui. 
46 On this kind of witnessing, and self-witnessing, see Wildberger 2014 with further references.  
47 Barton 2001, p. 133; see also, e.g., Bartsch 2006, pp. 183-216. Edwards 1999 explores how Seneca negotiates 
this borderline in the Epistulae morales. 
48 Different from my reading, Heikkinen 1997 assumes that Mucius is assimilated to a “a common man by 
stating that Mucius was learned only as a soldier” (p. 71). 
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same way, Cicero assumes that “a learned and wise man” (doctus vir sapiensque) will 
disregard physical pain just as easily as a veteran soldier (Tusc. 2.39). Cicero’s interlocutor in 
that dialogue, or any other Roman man “born for glory,” will be superior to a lowly gladiator: 
He will strengthen his mind with mental training and reasoning (meditatione et ratione) 
instead of just the physical hardships that prepare a gladiator for the arena.49 
 
6. Dispersal: Martial 
A spectacle, and at the same time punishment, in a more literal sense happens in Martial’s 
epigrams. Here we encounter performing criminals, unfree bodies, not philosophers. Two of 
the epigrams (8.30 and 10.25) comment on a staging of Scaevola’s deed, in which a convict 
was forced to represent the Roman hero. A third one (1.21) describes the exemplum without 
an explicit reference to such a punishment at the public games. This third epigram shares 
central features of the versions in Seneca: the contempt of fire, the glory and greater success 
because of failure, the emphatic use of the verb facere (in line 8). However, there are also new 
elements: Where Seneca’s Mucius is able to stand and watch his burning hand, Martial’s 
Porsenna is unable to bear the sight (3) and cannot watch (6) the hand that Mucius can burn. 
Most strikingly, Mucius’ multi-levelled but concentrated and self-asserting agency is lost. It 
disperses into different agents, first the hand itself that, so to speak, throws itself onto the pyre 
(1-2), then Porsenna, who “snatches the man” (no longer the hand) “from the flames and tells 
him to leave” (3-4). As a third agent, Mucius proves himself capable of burning the hand (5-
6), whereas in the last distich the focus is again on the hand itself and the respective fame it 
could have achieved with or without failing in its original purpose (7-8).  
It is uncertain whether this epigram was inspired by the same event as the other two,50 but the 
loss of an agent and the concomitant loss in dignity are clear signs that Martial refers to the 
public spectacle. It is also instructive to see how the loss of agency and dignity is incurred, 
namely by making the hand the main agent of the poem. With a body-part acting itself and 
standing for the whole person, the relation so constitutive for a person’s integrity is inversed. 
Here the internal body (ii) has become the self endowed with volition, and the mind-body 
hierarchy is overturned. It is no longer possible to split off the body or have the mind, and so 
                                                 
49 Cic. Tusc. 2.41. Physical training (consuetudo, exercitatio) are discussed in the preceding sections, while the 
mental training is described beginning from § 42.  
50 Citroni 1975, p. 76 on Mart. 1.21. 
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the real man, assume supremacy over it.51 This mirrors the fact that in the spectacle of an 
individual suffering some painful experience at public games, the outwardly visible social 
body (i) does no longer belong to the agent, but to the public and its gaze.52 
The same effect obtains even more clearly in epigram 8.30, which juxtaposes humiliation and 
praise. Here, the victim serves to entertain and enhance the glory of the emperor and is not 
quite allowed to become more than “a hand.” What once was the greatest possible glory has 
now become a spectacle in the Emperor’s games (1-2). The hand we encounter is even more 
active than the one in 1.21: it “holds the flames and enjoys the punishment” (3), is itself 
strong (4 fortis). Whereas Livy’s Mucius prevails upon a king thunderstruck (12.13 attonitus) 
by Mucius’ miraculous deed, here it is the hand that “rules like a king” (4 regnat) – but only 
over a thing, the fire, which is itself “thunderstruck” (4) by what the hand is doing in it. Again 
we have the gaze that Seneca attributed to Mucius, and now it is the criminal himself (5 ipse) 
who lovingly watches “the noble funeral of his right hand” (5) – only to vanish again and give 
way for acting and desiring hands. The right hand “feasts” (6 pascitur) on the fire and if the 
“punishment” had not been taken away, the left hand too would have penetrated (in … ire) the 
already “worn-out hearth” (8 lassos … focos). The person thus vanishes behind the body and 
the visible deed, to such a degree that it becomes difficult to say whether the one against 
whose will (nolenti) the fire is removed is the hand or the man. The same ambiguity continues 
in the last distich, where Martial declares that he does not care what the convict (?) or the 
hand (?) had done before (9 quid fecerit ante). In the end, Martial is only interested in the 
hand he has seen, not in the person, whether good or bad. Paradoxically, “aggressive 
passivity” now contributes to effacing the person. The intensity of visible movement of the 
social body (i) and the attribution of agency to the inner body (ii) constitute a role reversal 
between inner body (ii) and mind, and thus a lack of will and mental control in the person. 
That the emphasis on the hand and thus the loss of the hedges around an agent’s dignity is 
deliberate can be gleaned from a comparison with the third epigram (10.25). Here Martial 
contradicts his original praise and deflates the heroism, which in this case would clearly be 
the heroism of the punished man himself. A Mucius, a masculine subject still ambiguously 
“watched” (spectatus) – looked at by the spectators but also proven and found good53 – at the 
morning games, “placed his own limbs upon the hearth” (1-2) – with the same downward 
movement that already characterized the hero in one of Seneca’s descriptions (n. 37). 
                                                 
51 Compare also Anthologia Latina 155, where una … dextra (6) constitutes something of a climax to “one single 
man.” 
52 On this kind of penetrative, humiliating gazing, see Bartsch 2006, especially p. 162.  
53 OLD s.v. spectatus 2: “[of persons, their lives, etc.] of observed merit or worth, distinguished.” 
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However, while this act is gradually unmasked as a form of cowardice, a show enforced by 
the threat of greater pain, namely being burnt alive in a tunica molesta (5-6), the man 
apparently so “patiens, hard and brave” becomes “the kind of54 heart you’d expect in rabble 
from Abdera” (4). He dissolves into an anonymous plurality of “chests” (pectora) and a 
common crowd (plebis). Nor are body and mind clearly distinguished but blend in that body 
part which is also the seat of the mind. Paradoxically, in this case, inaction, refusing to 
perform, would have been true agency (6), and so the poor convict’s choice to do as he was 
told elicits the poet’s scorn. The glory earned by the social body (i) in its visible performance 
is debunked by revealing base concern for the inner body (ii) that drives the observed 
behavior. 
 
7. Hedges and the physio-psychology of pain 
What I hope to have shown so far is that there are specific patterns of hedging what were 
face-endangering aspects of pain inflicted through artificial injury even if tolerated bravely55 
and that these hedges are closely related to a concept of masculinity as constituted by agency 
and impenetrability. We have also seen that these patterns can be observed in a particularly 
rich, emphatic, and at the same time focused fashion in Seneca’s versions of the Scaevola-
exemplum. I wish to close this paper with a few remarks on the psychology underlying these 
hedges, i.e. the way in which Seneca and other philosophers imagined pain as a phenomenon 
pertaining to the inner body (ii) and the person as a whole.  
With regard to pain, Seneca writes (Ep. 71.27): 
I do not set apart the sage from other human beings, nor do I remove pains from him 
as if he were some block of stone closed to any feeling (nullum sensum admittente). I 
remember that he is composed of two parts: One is irrational, and it is this one which 
is bitten and burnt, and hurts. The other is rational: this one has unshakeable beliefs, is 
intrepid and indomitable. 
Similarly, Cicero distinguishes (Tusc. 2.47)  
in the minds of almost all humans something that is by nature soft, submissive, 
humble, somehow forceless and flaccid 
                                                 
54 The plural pectora here seems to point to a typical attitude. 
55 Another, much longer paper could be written about tolerating pain caused by illness. See Edwards 1999 on 
this topic in Seneca. 
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and on the other hand 
reason, the Lady and Queen of everything, who by straining and proceeding further 
becomes perfected virtue.  
Usually, Cicero’s distinction is read as a testimony for psychological dualism,56 while readers 
of Seneca waver between taking the passage as a reference to dualism or just as a distinction 
between body and soul.57 For the question at hand, it is of no fundamental import whether that 
weak element is a part of the soul susceptible to feeling bodily pain or the body itself as that 
part of the human in which feelings of pain occur. The internal body (i) is a construct, and 
similarly the different possible interpretations of the passages quoted here point to a certain 
fuzziness in the concept of “body” rather than any assumed physiological difference. For 
obviously, Seneca’s “body,” if the body is the referent at Ep. 71,27, is an entity with 
sensations and thus endowed with some kind of sensory function itself. The alternative 
reading would understand Seneca as talking about the body plus “the features of the soul 
which are bound to it.”58 What is important is that both Cicero and Seneca contrast a weak 
and vulnerable part of the whole person with reason.  
Reason itself is not affected like the weak part, according to Seneca, at least not in a sage, 
when it has been perfected. In the same way, Cicero states about manliness (virtus), which is 
perfected reason (Tusc. 2.47-48): 
A man must take care that it is this one which commands that other part of the soul, 
which should obey. “And how?” you will ask. Like a master [gives orders] to his slave 
or like a general to his solder or a father to his son. 
The separation of person and inner body (ii) that we observed in the various accounts of the 
Scaevola-exemplum thus reoccurs framed as a relation between a weaker and a stronger part 
of the person, with the stronger part clearly identified as reason or the rational mind. An 
impact on the body, or the weaker part, cannot impinge on a healthy, well-developed reason. 
Containing the bitings, burnings and hurts of the weaker part appears as self-control and 
provides reason with agency so that it can control others and the situation as well.  
Just as a slave belongs to his master, not someone else, and a soldier may obey only his own 
general, and a son only his own father, the weaker part should follow the lead of the strong 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Pohlenz’s commentary on the passage: “C. will Plato Rep. 430e wiedergeben […].” Pohlenz also 
points to Panaetius as the source of Cic. Off. 1.101. The idea of progress and perfection of virtue is Stoic. 
Sceptical, as concerns the ascription of a dualist psychology to Panaetius is Prost 2002. 
57 See, e.g., Inwood 2007, 197 ad loc. 
58 Inwood 2007, p. 197. 
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part and not submit to the control of anyone else. The philosophers do not imagine the person 
in pain being split into a body shaken by its suffering while reason looks down on it, serene 
and unperturbed, from a higher sphere. The body is protected and stabilized too whenever 
reason is able to fully assume its natural role. It will harden the body through physical training 
(e.g. Tusc. 2.36) but also strengthen the weaker part of the mind together with the strong one’s 
training and reasoning (Tusc. 2.41). Whether it is tension (τόνος) or a particularly tightly knit 
coherence that leads to “strength of mind” (robur animi), the perfectly rational mind not only 
becomes impenetrable itself, repelling the darts of Fortune from its surface; at least to a 
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